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Abstract 
 
When a deficit occurs in the funding of collective goods, it is usually covered by raising the 
amount of taxes or by rationing the supply of the goods.  This article compares the efficiency of 
these institutions.  We report the results of a 2x2 experiment based on a game in the first stage of 
which subjects can voluntarily contribute to the funding of a collective good that is being used to 
compensate the victims of a disaster.  In the second stage of the game, in case of a deficit, we 
introduce either taxation or rationing.  Each treatment is subjected to two conditions: the burden 
of the deficit is either uniform for all the subjects, or individualized according to the first-stage 
contribution.  We show that the individualized treatments favor the provision of the collective 
good through voluntary cooperation whereas the uniform treatments encourage free-riding.  
Individualized taxation brings the voluntary contributions closer to the optimum while uniform 
rationing appears to be the worst system since free-riding restrains the provision of the good.  
 
Résumé: Un déficit dans le financement d'un bien collectif est généralement couvert soit par un 
accroissement des impôts, soit par un rationnement des usagers.  Cet article compare l'efficacité 
de ces institutions. Nous présentons les résultats d'une expérience de laboratoire qui s'appuie sur 
un jeu dans la première étape duquel les sujets peuvent contribuer volontairement au 
financement d'un bien collectif destiné à indemniser les victimes d'un dommage. Dans la 
deuxième étape du jeu, en cas de déficit, nous introduisons soit un impôt, soit un rationnement.  
Chaque traitement est soumis à deux conditions: la prise en charge du déficit est soit uniforme 
pour tous les sujets, soit individualisée en fonction de la contribution volontaire du sujet en 
première étape. Nous montrons que les traitements individualisés favorisent la provision du bien 
collectif grâce à la coopération volontaire, alors que les traitements uniformes encouragent le 
comportement de passager clandestin. L'impôt individualisé rapproche les contributions 
volontaires de l'optimum, tandis que le rationnement uniforme est la pire institution puisque le 
comportement de passager clandestin restreint la provision du bien. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are instances in which members of a group or society are confronted to the same 
basic need in their lifetime but do not face it simultaneously.  For example, all families will need 
to send their young children at school and all persons suffering from diseases will need health 
care.  Over a great number of periods, such needs will be felt with near certainty. In a given 
period, however, the distribution of needs in a large population might be considered random. 
Consequently, privately consumed goods and services of this sort can be mutually funded like an 
insurance policy in order to take advantage of risk diversification.  Redistributive taxation and 
rationing are two widely used policies for financing such collective goods.  In the first case, the 
optimal provision of the good is guaranteed but the deficit generated by the insufficient level of 
voluntary contribution is funded by compulsory taxes at an additional cost for society.  In the 
second case, the collective good is provided only to the extent that it has been voluntarily funded 
by group members.  The budget constraint is always met at the cost of possibly providing the 
collective good at a suboptimal level.  Taxation adjusts aggregate contributions to the socially 
desirable consumption level, while rationing adjusts aggregate consumption to the sum of 
voluntary contributions.  In any case, however, redistribution generally occurs.  This has the 
effect of blurring the relation between the price paid by each individual to satisfy his need and the 
marginal utility of the collective good, at the expense of efficiency.  
The goal of this paper is to compare the efficiency of various modes of redistributive taxation and 
rationing in the provision of collective goods.  Specifically, we introduce uniform and 
individualized modes of both taxation and rationing policies.  Uniform and individualized modes 
reflect different conceptions of equity: the former value equal treatment a priori whereas the latter 
value equal outcomes a posteriori.  By crossing two policies (taxation, rationing) with two modes 
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(uniform, individualized), we are able to compare four different institutions that are widely used 
for funding collective goods.  We question here the ability of these institutions to give individuals 
a sense of “responsibility” by letting them spontaneously come closer to efficiency.  
For this purpose, we have designed a laboratory experiment based on a two-stage collective good 
(insurance) game.  We observe individual contribution behavior when private needs are met 
collectively and prices are not expressed on a market.1  In the first stage, subjects receive an 
endowment and voluntarily contribute to a common pool intended to compensate for the losses 
suffered by those members of the group who happen to be randomly hit at the beginning of the 
second stage.  In the second stage, two situations may occur.  If the losses can be fully or more 
than fully covered by voluntary contributions in the aggregate, each victim can be totally 
compensated and any surplus is burnt.   On the other hand, if the voluntary contributions fall 
short of the losses to be covered in the aggregate, four different solutions for equalizing the 
supply of funds and the demand for compensation are being considered. Uniform policies offer 
equal treatment of group members in the second stage (ex post), irrespective of their individual 
effort in the first stage (ex ante).  In contrast, individualized policies offer a differentiated 
treatment of group members in the second stage, specifically favoring those who contributed 
most in the first stage.  Thus, four institutions are considered in the second stage in a 2x2 
experimental design.  We describe them respectively as uniform taxation, individualized taxation, 
uniform rationing and individualized rationing.   
The four treatments share the same social optimum of “equal contribution for all”.  However, 
they lead to very different Nash equilibria: no contribution for uniform policies, an interior 
                                                 
1 Olson (1965), Dawes and Thaler (1988) and Ostrom (1990) have shown how, in this context of collective action, it 
is tempting for the actors to free-ride on the others’ contribution. 
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contribution for individualized rationing, and both symmetric and asymmetric contributions 
including a number of over-contributions for individualized taxation.  Repeating the game fifty 
times allows us to observe the convergence to the predicted Nash equilibria and its speed, and the 
selection of equilibrium when many equilibria exist.  Thus, the experimental design enables a 
clean comparison of four widely used policies which are normatively equivalent but may lead to 
much contrasted equilibria 
The specificity of our paper with respect to the experimental literature on the provision of public 
goods is fourfold.  The first specificity has to do with the nature of the good.  Our game considers 
collective goods and not public goods, in the sense that only the victims of the disaster can share 
the good whereas a pure public good is non-excludable.  In public good games, each subject 
generally benefits from a unique marginal return from the good  (Davis and Holt 1993; Ledyard 
1995).  In our game, since only the victims of the damage share the collective good, an 
individual’s contribution can have a null internal return and a positive external return if he does 
not become a victim himself.2  This design allows us to study behavior in a framework where the 
subjects are not assured to get a return from their contribution and to compare the contributions as 
a function of whether there is a guarantee to compensate the victims or not.   
The second novelty of our experiment resides in the comparison of the efficiency of sanctions on 
voluntary contributions when various combinations of private and public funding of the collective 
good are used.  Here, the sanction is targeted only to the victims in the case of purely private 
financing of the collective good (rationing), whereas it is inflicted to the entire group in the case 
                                                 
2 Other experiments allow a contribution to the public good to have an interior return (for the person who 
contributes) different from its public return (for the other members) to isolate altruism (Carter, Drainville, and Poulin 
1992; Goeree, Holt, and Laury 2002). In contrast, in our experiment, when an individual decides of his contribution, 
he ignores whether or not he will be a victim of the damage.  
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of mixed financing (taxation).  Since taxation triggers an additional monetary cost, a crowding-
out effect of the voluntary contributions by taxation (Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; 
Roberts 1987; Andreoni 1993) is less likely in our experiment.   
The third novelty of our experiment is the comparison of the efficiency of uniform versus 
individualized mechanisms.  Individualization is here related to a difference in the individuals’ 
contribution behavior, not to a difference of their ex ante situation (in terms of endowment, Isaac 
and Walker, 1988, or of marginal return of the good, Chan, Mestelman, Moir, and Muller, 1999).  
It becomes feasible to test whether individualizing the consequences of a deficit gives the agents 
a sense of responsibility towards the voluntary funding of the collective good, whereas uniform 
treatments reduce the feeling of responsibility.3   
A last specificity of our experiment lies in the non linearity of the collective good’s return, which 
allows us to compare various treatments having a common interior optimum but different Nash 
equilibria.  Introducing an interior equilibrium in public good games, Andreoni (1993), Sefton 
and Steinberg (1996), Keser (1996), Isaac and Walker (1988), Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999), 
Holt and Laury (2000) show that the subjects still over-contribute, but over-contribution is 
reduced as the equilibrium draws closer to the optimum.  In our game the optimum is interior and 
similar across treatments, and we vary its distance to the equilibria.  Thus, we can study how 
various cooperation risks, i.e. the gap between the equilibrium and the optimum, influence 
behavior. 
The predictions of our theoretical model are confirmed by the results of the experiment.  Uniform 
rationing is the least efficient system in terms of the contribution level in that it does not 
                                                 
3 From a theoretical point of view, Kirchsteiger and Puppe (1997) show that a linear uniform tax-subsidy policy, 
where the individual tax depends solely on the sum of the other members’ voluntary contributions, can implement 
the optimal contribution only under very strict conditions. 
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discourage free-riding and the service is not provided to the victims.  Uniform taxation does not 
perform much better since the collective good is provided but at an extra cost for the community, 
which puts a strain on efficiency.  Individualized rationing enhances the sense of responsibility, 
but cooperation is not complete and the service is not provided in full.  The most efficient 
institution turns out to be individualized taxation.  With an average contribution in the 
neighborhood of the optimum, cooperation is more important and is stable over time.  This 
mechanism confers to individuals the highest sense of responsibility towards the funding of the 
collective good.  It cancels most of the crowding-out effect of taxes on the voluntary 
contributions, by protecting cooperative individuals against being exploited by the free riders. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the theoretical model.  Section 3 
details the experimental design. Section 4 analyzes the results.  Finally, section 5 concludes and 
discusses the implications of these observations. 
2.  THEORY 
The game consists of a two-stage collective good (insurance) game. For each of the four 
treatments that we consider, we identify in this section the social optimum and Nash equilibria.  
Every individual decides whether to spend part of his income Y on a mutual fund, which has the 
purpose of covering losses for randomly hit subjects.   
Let Y 100 tokens be the income perceived by subject i ≡ ),...,1( N∈ in a given period; 
ig : the voluntary contribution of individual i to the collective good ( ); 0≥ig
 
%di : the random loss suffered by individual i, which can only take two values: 0 or .  This 
loss is an i.i.d. Bernoulli variable.  
0>d
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iπ : the profit or net payoff of i  ( iπ~  if the individual profit is random). 
Each of the S victims may experience one disaster at most in any period of game.4  Thus, 
N
Sp ≡  
represents the probability that any individual in a group of N become a victim following S draws 
without replacement.  In our experiment, ;4,12 == SN hence, 31=p . 
We consider successively 2 x 2 policies that can be implemented in case of a budget deficit: 
(taxation, rationing) x (uniform, individualized).  In case total contributions exceed the total 
losses experienced by the victims, the surplus is burnt.5  
2.1. Uniform taxation 
             The payoff function is:  
2
1
1 1
1
          if     1100
2
          if     100                                                                     
N
N N
j
ji j j
j ji N
j
i j
L g
g L g L g
N N
L gg
αβπ == =
=
⎧ ⎡ ⎤ >⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎢ ⎥− − − − + −⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎪ ≤−⎪⎩
∑∑ ∑
∑
 (1) 
where 0andα β > . 
The individual i’s final payoff is represented by the second row of Equation (1) when the budget 
is sufficient ex ante to cover losses in the aggregate.  It is then simply obtained by subtracting i’s 
voluntary contribution to the collective good from the period income.  There is an obvious 
                                                 
4 This hypothesis makes the number of disasters S and the total amount of losses ( ) fixed values, 
thus shortening the gap between the situation of a small experimental group and what the law of large numbers 
would naturally achieve in a large group. 
LSdd
N
i
i =≡∑
=1
~
5 We justify this assumption by its experimental simplicity, and for reflecting the inflationary nature of public 
expenditure through the principle that most taxes are not targeted, so that a local surplus will be redistributed to other 
public uses within the same period. 
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incentive for each player to free ride if losses can be covered by the voluntary contributions of 
other players.  However, irresponsible behavior tends to create a budget deficit ex ante; and, if 
this occurs, individual i’s final payoff will be defined by the first row of Equation (1).  The 
income net of own contribution is now diminished by the cost of financing the deficit imputed to 
i.  The third term describes the individualized contribution to covering the deficit. The last term 
between brackets with , 0α β >  represents the extra cost of taxation.  The latter is a quadratic 
function of the deficit because the deadweight loss of taxation is supposed to increase in the size 
of the deficit.  Under uniform taxation, all members of the pool share the same burden 
irrespective of their initial contribution.  
The complete coverage of victims removes any risk.  The planner simply maximizes the sum of 
payoffs which is symmetric in all individual contributions.  Hence, everybody must contribute by 
the same amount:   
                        ( )          1,...,j ig g j i N≡ ∀ ≠ ∈ . 
The normative payoff per capita (1) is described as follows: 
[ ]2* 100 2
100                            
i
i
i
L L Ng
N N
g
αβπ
⎧ ⎧ ⎫− − + −⎨ ⎬⎪= ⎩ ⎭⎨⎪ −⎩
          
ig
i
Lif g
N
Lif
N
<
≥
 (2) 
Function *iπ  reaches its maximum when ,i Lg N=  and the budget is balanced ex ante. This 
defines the social optimum.  
The Nash equilibrium is attained when each player i maximizes his payoff with respect to the 
others’ contributions.  If g denotes the average contribution of all the other players, i’s payoff is: 
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 π i =
100 − gi −
1
N
L − (N −1)g − gi⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − β + α2N L − (N −1)g − gi( )2⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥ if gi + (N −1)g < L
100 − gi  if  gi + (N −1)g ≥ L 
⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
 
 (3) 
In the presence of a deficit, the payoff is given by the first row of Equation (3).  Its maximum is 
reached for a null contribution if the following condition is met: 1−≤ NLα , which is the case for 
reasonable values of α and, in particular, in our experiment.  By symmetry, all the players then 
have a null contribution in equilibrium.  In the absence of a deficit, the maximum payoff is 
obtained for: 0)1( ≥≡−−= DgNLgi , where  is the ex ante deficit before i’s contribution 
and takes an integer value.  For Nash equilibrium to exist without an ex ante deficit, we must 
have: 
D
)0()( ii D ππ ≥ . Comparison of the first and second rows of Equation (3) yields after 
simplification: 01
2
2 >+−− βα D
N
ND
N
.  
With the numerical values given to the constant parameters α and β in our experiment 
( 2,005. == βα ), the only admissible values are: =D 0, 1, 2, that is, 1−N subjects almost cover 
total expected losses all together and the th player gives almost nothing.  However, such 
equilibria seem highly implausible and should not be selected if players have rational 
expectations.  Indeed, they imply that a player believes that some other players have over-
contributed (above L/N), which is not a rational expectation in our design in which any budget 
surplus is burnt, unless the fixed and marginal deadweight cost of a deficit grow large enough. 
Thus, when uniform taxation is used to finance a budget deficit, zero contribution is the likely 
Nash equilibrium if 
N
1−≤ NLα .  
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2.2. Individualized taxation  
              In contrast with the previous policy, the tax levied on individual i for financing a budget 
deficit now offsets the voluntary contribution.  Player i’s payoff is therefore defined as follows:   
 
π i =
100 − gi −
L
N
− gi
L − g j
j=1
N∑
L − g j
J =1
N∑⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
− β + α
2N
L − g j
j=1
N∑⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
2⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬⎪
⎭⎪
100 − gi                                                                 
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪⎪
          if     L > g j
j=1
N∑
          if     L ≤ g j
j=1
N∑
 
The term between brackets with , 0α β >  represents the extra cost of financing the deficit.  The 
third term describes the individualized contribution to covering the deficit.    
After simplification, 
2
1
1
1
          if     
100
2
          if     100                               
N
N j
jj
i j N
ji
j
L gL L g
N N
L gg
αβπ ==
=
⎧ >⎡ ⎤⎪ − − − −⎢ ⎥= ⎨ ⎣ ⎦⎪ ≤−⎩
∑∑
∑
 (4) 
As in the previous case, the complete coverage of victims removes any risk. As a consequence, 
the normative payoff function has the same expression as in (2).  Thus, the social optimum is 
unchanged: all subjects must equally contribute L
N
 to reach a balanced budget ex ante.  Although 
the social optimum does not depend on the nature of taxation, individualization has the effect of 
making the social optimum a Nash equilibrium as well.  If agent i is looking for the maximum 
payoff given the others’ contributions (equal to g on average), i’s payoff is expressed as:  
( )2100 ( 1) ( 1)  2
100 ( 1)
i i
i
i i
L L N g g if g N g L
N N
g if g N g L
αβπ
⎧ − − − − − − + − <⎪= ⎨⎪ − + − ≥⎩
 (5) 
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It reaches its maximum when the budget is balanced ex ante, if β+≤ NLD , i.e. if ( 1−N ) 
members of the group have made on average an almost optimal contribution.  One of these 
balanced budget-equilibria is symmetric and coincides with the social optimum.  Intuitively, an 
individual who believes that other members have paid their share of expected total losses and 
knows that he will have to pay his own share anyway will prefer to do it ex ante rather than ex 
post in order to avoid the payment of the additional cost.   
There are also asymmetric equilibria with an ex ante budget deficit.  In these, the individualized 
taxation guarantees that the more generous players will not be penalized ex post, since all players 
eventually will get the same profit.  Furthermore, as their payoff depends on the ex ante deficit 
and rapidly decreases in this deficit (given the quadratic term), some players may over contribute 
relative to the social optimum in order to curb the deficit and the resulting efficiency cost. 
2.3. Uniform rationing  
          Rationing the contributors is another way of financing a publicly-funded insurance.  Now, 
there can be no deficit to be covered ex post because the amount of indemnities will be 
automatically adjusted to the sum of voluntary contributions if the latter are not high enough to 
cover all losses.  Pool members collectively bear the risk of being only partly covered if they 
become victims, so that an agent’s net payoff becomes uncertain even though the sum of 
individual losses is certain.  We first consider uniform rationing of the victims: each victim’s loss 
is limited by the sum of all contributions to the fund relative to losses.  This is expressed as 
follows:      
 12
Nj1
j=1
N
j
j=1
          if     g
100 1
          if     g
100                          
N
j
j
i i
i
i
g L
g d
L
L
g
π
=
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎜ ⎟ <⎪ ⎜ ⎟− − −⎪= ⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ≥⎝ ⎠⎪ −⎪⎩
∑ ∑
∑
%
%  (6) 
The presence of an individual risk makes the definition of the social optimum problematic 
because the social planner must account for the players’ risk attitudes.  A psychologically-
founded solution (see Lévy-Garboua et al., 2006) is to assume that the social planner behaves like 
an impartial judge who, by lack of knowledge of others, attributes them his own characteristics in 
terms of initial wealth and risk aversion.  Since all members of the group enter symmetrically in 
this game, the social planner i would choose the same contribution gi for all and eventually 
maximize his own expected utility, )~( ∗+ iii wEU π , with: 
*
          if     100 1
          if     100                       
i i
i i
i
ii
LNg gg d NL
Lgg
N
π
⎧ ⎛ ⎞ <⎪ − − −⎪ ⎜ ⎟= ⎝ ⎠⎨⎪ ≥−⎪⎩
%
%  (7) 
If the sum of contributions covers the sum of losses, all subjects are fully insured and receive a 
sure payoff.  The optimum is then obtained for i
Lg
N
= . However, payoffs are uncertain if 
contributions fall short of the amount of losses.  Consequently, the social planner maximizes the 
following expected utility: 
( ) ( ) ( )* 1 100 100 1 ii i i i i i i i i NgEU w p U w g pU w g d Lπ ⎛ ⎞⎛+ = − + − + + − − −⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠% ⎞⎟⎟  (8) 
where designates his concave utility function of wealth (iU 0,0 <′′>′ ii UU ).  It is shown in 
Appendix A that the social optimum still corresponds to
N
Lgi = , as in the case of taxation.  A 
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remarkable feature of our definition of the social optimum is that it is robust to variations of 
endowed wealth and risk aversion.   
To determine the Nash equilibrium, we consider that player i maximizes his expected utility 
given the other players’ contributions .  The payoff writes as: ),...,,,...,( 111 Nii gggg +−
100 [1 ]
100
i j
j i
i i i j
j ii
i i j
j i
g g
g d if g g L
L
g if g g L
π
≠
≠
≠
⎧ +⎪⎪ − − − + <⎪= ⎨⎪⎪ − + ≥⎪⎩
∑ ∑
∑
%
%  (9) 
If there exists a Nash equilibrium without a budget deficit, it must be  andDgi = Di −= 100π .  
In case of a budget deficit, the random payoff is described by the first line of equation (9) and the 
expected utility writes as follows: 
)1100()100()1()~( i
ij
j
iiiiiii gS
S
S
g
S
LwpUgwUpEU −−+−++−+−=
∑
≠π  
               )1100()100()1( iiiiii gS
S
S
DwpUgwUp −−−++−+−=  
It reaches its maximum when the player’s contribution is null regardless of the other players’ 
contributions.  The null contribution represents the only equilibrium since the expected utility is 
then greater than the balanced budget utility )100( DwU ii −+ for all D.  
2.4. Individualized rationing  
The rationing is individualized by having it depend on each individual contribution to the 
fund relative to the contributions of the other victims.  We impose here the two following 
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conditions, implicitly respected by previous institutions: (i) a victim’s compensation can never 
exceed his loss; (ii) the sum of compensations paid to the victims is always covered by the sum of 
contributions.  This can be written as: 
                 )1(~100~ iiii cdg −−−=π , (10) 
where  is the coverage rate of losses, lying between 0 and 1 (condition (i)).  The condition (ii) 
imposes:
ic
L
g
c
S
N
j
jS
k
k
∑∑ =
=
≤ 1
1
1 , with k=(1,…, S) designating the victims within the group.  When the 
sum of the contributions covers all the losses, each victim is fully insured and receives a certain 
payoff.   When this sum does not cover all the losses, payoff is uncertain and the coverage of 
every rationed victim is proportional to his own contribution relative to that of the other victims. 
This writes: 
               1
1
1
min(1, )
1
N
j N
j i
i S
j
k
k
g
gc
L g
S
=
=
=
=
∑ ∑∑ j
if g L<
L
 (11) 
                
1
1
N
i j
j
c i if g
=
= ∀ ≥∑
To determine the social optimum, we proceed exactly as we did in the case of uniform rationing. 
Thanks to the symmetry of the problem, profits take the form of Equation (7).  Consequently, the 
social optimum is still *i
Lg
N
= for all i ),...,1( N= , which is robust to variations in endowed wealth 
and risk aversion. 
Consider next the Nash equilibrium of this game.  If the equilibrium comprises some rationing, 
the coverage rate is given by the first row of Equation (11).  Note, however, that the rate of 
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coverage of player i is irrelevant if he is not hit by the damage and that players are never better 
off contributing beyond what suffices to supply them with full insurance, given all the other 
contributions.  Hence, the coverage rate given by Equation (11) can be expressed more simply as: 
                                           1≤+
+
= ∑
∑
≠
≠
S
L
g
gg
gg
c i
ik
ki
ij
ji
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Players usually hold incomplete information about the other players’ preferences.  Thus, it is 
rational for player i to perceive the other players’ contributions as i.i.d. draws from a given 
distribution and to estimate their average contribution.  The occurrence of a disaster being 
random, this estimation must be the same for both the victims and the non-victims: 
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By reporting this estimation of the average contribution in Equation (13), we get: 
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The Nash equilibrium necessarily comprises rationing if NLg i ≤− , which is a rational 
expectation (see proof of proposition 1 in Appendix A).6   We can further characterize this 
equilibrium by showing that the players’ contribution is positive (see proof of proposition 2 in 
                                                 
6 The reverse condition, NLg i >− , implies an over-contribution of other players on average, which is not a 
rational expectation if over insurance is prohibited. 
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Appendix A).  The interior equilibrium obtained under individualized rationing contrasts with the 
corner solution of no contribution that characterized uniform rationing.  
Table 1 summarizes the theoretical solutions for each institution. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Only does the individualized taxation institution lead to a solution where the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium coincides with the social optimum.  In contrast, the Nash equilibrium diverges 
radically from the social optimum under uniform taxation or rationing, and less sharply under 
individualized rationing.  Therefore, from a theoretical perspective, individualized taxation is 
likely to constitute the best performing institution. It should be noted that, if the player maximizes 
the discounted profit over T periods, the solutions of the four models (social optimum and Nash 
equilibrium) do not change thanks to the additive separability. 
 
3. THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Our 2x2 experiment consists of four treatments corresponding to the four institutions 
modeled in the theoretical section. 
Twelve participants form a group (N=12).  Each participant is given an initial endowment of 100 
tokens.7  Everyone can contribute to a common pool that serves to compensate the victims of a 
disaster who are fully deprived of their initial endowment.  The individual contribution is a 
number of tokens chosen between 0 and 100 ( [ ]0,100ig ∈ ). Four of the 12 group members are 
then randomly hit by the disaster (S=4) so that the total loss is exactly 400 tokens (L=400). When 
                                                 
7 At the beginning of the first period, to avoid the possibility of negative earnings, each participant was given an 
endowment of 110 tokens.  This does not influence the theoretical predictions. 
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the latter is fully and equally covered by all participants, all contributions amount to 33 or 34 
tokens8.  This corresponds to the optimum in the four treatments. The deadweight loss parameters 
of the deficit made up by taxation are 0.005α =  and 2β = .  The equilibrium is to contribute 
nothing in the two uniform treatments.  In the individualized treatments, the taxation policy leads 
to a symmetric equilibrium with a contribution of 33-34 and asymmetric equilibria with a number 
of over-contributions; and the rationing policy leads to an interior equilibrium with effective 
rationing and contributions spreading between 1 and 32.  Each session consists of 50 periods, 
allowing us to observe long run contribution dynamics.  
We have conducted 6 experimental sessions per treatment, for a total of 24 sessions of 12 
participants each.  In order to capture the possible role of cultural differences, half of the sessions 
for each treatment were run in Montréal (Canada), and half in Lyon (France), on the same dates.9  
In total, the experiment summoned 288 French-speaking participants, mostly students.  It was 
programmed with the REGATE software (Zeiliger, 2000). 
Once all the participants were present, each one randomly drew a ticket with a computer name 
out of an envelope.  After distributing the instructions and reading them aloud, the participants’ 
questions were privately answered and a questionnaire was used to check that all instructions had 
been well understood.10  The latter were written in neutral terms.  The average duration of 
sessions was an hour and a half including the payment of participants that was done in private in 
                                                 
8 
 
L
N
= 33.33 must be converted in an integer number of tokens.  
9 The Montreal sessions were conducted in the BUL-CIRANO lab (Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on 
Organizations) and the Lyon sessions at GATE (Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Économique). 
10 The instructions for two of the treatments are presented in Appendix B. The instructions for the other treatments are 
available upon request to the authors. 
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a separate room. The conversion rate was 300 tokens = 1.55 Canadian Dollar = 1 Euro.  The 
average earnings were 35 Canadian Dollars or 23 Euros.   
Moreover, the participants had a choice between getting a show-up fee of 5 Dollars (2 Euros) and 
participating in a lottery in which they had equal chances of winning either 11 Dollars (5 Euros) 
or 0.  The participants who had chosen the show-up fee were tentatively considered as being 
more risk averse.  They tossed a coin at the end of the session to determine their extra earnings. 
4. THE RESULTS 
After a presentation of the main descriptive statistics, we successively analyze the 
contribution behavior, the heterogeneity of individual strategies, and the associated earnings.  
4.1. Summary statistics  
The first observation is striking but not really surprising: voluntary contributions are never 
sufficient to cover aggregate losses in the first stage, except for the individualized taxation 
treatment where a surplus was observed in 13% of the periods.  Indeed, the frequency of socially 
optimal individual contributions is small: only 1% in the uniform rationing treatment, 4% in both 
the individualized rationing and the uniform taxation treatments, and a peak of 10% in the 
individualized taxation treatment.  In addition, this frequency declines over time in three of the 
four treatments.  The exception is for individualized taxation where the symmetric equilibrium 
and the optimum overlap: the frequency of socially optimal contributions then rises from 7% in 
the first ten periods to 12% on average in the last ten periods.  
As a crude approximation, the spectrum of Nash equilibria is reflected in the spread of average 
contributions across treatments.  Participants gave 27.16 tokens on average (S.D. =22.55) under 
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individualized taxation and 15.74 tokens (S.D. =17.77) under individualized rationing, in 
conformity with the prediction of interior equilibria for individualized policies and of symmetric 
or almost symmetric equilibria for individualized taxation.  They only contributed 10.50 tokens 
(S.D. =15.26) under uniform taxation and 8.77 tokens (S.D. =16.55) under uniform rationing for 
which the predicted equilibrium is a null contribution.  Under uniform policies, the frequency of 
equilibrium, i.e. null, contributions is higher in the uniform rationing treatment (53%) than in the 
uniform taxation treatment (38%).  In contrast, null contributions are relatively rare in 
individualized treatments, where they diverge from equilibrium (14% in the individualized 
taxation treatment and 28% in the individualized rationing treatment).  Figure 1 displays the 
evolution of the average contributions over time for each treatment. 
 [Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows a strong proximity of the average contributions in the first period across 
treatments, with the exception of uniform rationing for which it is right away inferior.  The 
average contribution in the first period is about two thirds of the social optimum.  This strong 
regularity suggests that participants do not immediately anticipate the final equilibrium and 
follow a prior norm in the absence of information on the others’ behavior.  Behavior evolves 
however differently across treatments as the individuals get gradually informed of others’ 
behavior.  Individualized treatments stabilize the average contributions at a high level, whereas 
uniform treatments lead to a decline of contributions at the same speed.  Therefore, the common 
behavior that we observed in the first period cannot be interpreted as a signal of the players’ 
willingness to cooperate.  This gives further credit to the norm’s adherence interpretation of 
initial behavior.  In complement to these descriptive statistics, Table 2 analyzes the influence of 
time on individual contributions in the long run by estimating an OLS model for each treatment. 
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[Table 2 about here]  
The econometric analysis displayed in Table 2 confirms that, with the exception of the 
individualized taxation treatment, the average contributions to the collective good decrease with 
time.   If one estimates the asymptotic convergence in the treatments where the Nash equilibrium 
is to contribute nothing, the players should reach the equilibrium at the 63rd period.  In contrast, 
over all 50 periods, the average contribution in the individualized taxation treatment is stable and 
is only 6 units less than the optimum. 
Since the optimum is the same across treatments, behavior seems to be mainly guided by the 
equilibrium of each game.  It is also very clear that individualized taxation dominates all other 
policies and that the individualization of sanctions to under-provision reduces the prevalence and 
development of free riding that is much more apparent in the uniform treatments.   Although the 
optimum coincides with one of the symmetric equilibria in this taxation treatment, the optimum is 
however still not reached. This kind of situation has been observed before in the work of Saijo 
and Nakamura (1995).   
4.2. Determinants of the contribution behavior 
In order to analyze contribution behavior, we proceed with a two-step estimation. 11  We 
explain first the decision to contribute at all, and next the choice of a positive contribution 
conditional on the decision to contribute.  The first decision is studied by means of a panel Probit 
model; and the conditional amount spent on the collective good is estimated with a Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares model corrected from the selectivity bias.  Table 3 displays the results 
of these regressions. 
                                                 
11 A Tobit model of type 2 (or generalized Tobit) would be ideal for a one-step estimation, but is not very user-friendly 
with panel data. 
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[Table 3 about here] 
The impact of time on contributions appears in the first row of table 3.  In the uniform taxation 
treatment, both a higher number of zero contributions and a lower level of positive contributions 
explain the decline in the average contribution over time.  In the uniform rationing and the 
individual taxation treatments, the probability to contribute decreases over time.  In the 
individualized rationing treatment, the decline is due to a lower level of positive contribution.    
After controlling for the time trend and demographic variables12 in the regressions, we introduce 
a number of lagged exogenous variables and individual controls.  The lagged variables are 
intended to capture the process of convergence to equilibrium and temporary deviations from the 
time trend.  
The sum of the other group members’ contributions in the previous period controls for 
conditional cooperation.  For the sole individualized taxation treatment, we add a variable 
interacting the others’ contribution in the previous period with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
fund exhibits a deficit in that period; this variable is not included in the other regressions since 
the fund is always in deficit in the other treatments.  Our results demonstrate that conditional 
cooperation essentially concerns taxation policies.  A simple reason why it does not show up in 
the rationing treatments is that luck and risk taking behavior interfere with cooperative behavior 
to determine the net gains of any participant relative to the others.  In the uniform taxation 
treatment, conditional cooperation is only visible on the decision to contribute at all.  Indeed, 
since a uniform contribution to the budget deficit in the second stage does not level off previous 
                                                 
12 The individual controls include age, gender, student or worker status, education level, mathematical studies, past 
participation in an experiment, and location of the session (see descriptive statistics in Appendix C).  The lottery 
choice is taken into account as a risk aversion index. The demographic variables play no systematic role in the 
taxation treatments and few intervene in the rationing treatments.  
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disparities among contributors and the Nash equilibrium is a null contribution in this case, 
cooperators soon understand that their own efforts to cooperate are undermined by free riders to 
the exclusive benefit of the latter.  
The process is different in the individualized taxation treatment since many participants cooperate 
to some extent.  Thus, conditional cooperation is now visible on the choice of how much to 
contribute.  The coefficient of the interaction variable formed with the others’ contribution in the 
previous period when the budget was in deficit is significantly negative.  This means that, when 
the fund is in deficit in the previous period, the reaction of participants to a perceived low 
contribution of others is to offer a high contribution to avoid the penalty associated with a deficit; 
whereas if the contribution of others is high, participants offer a low contribution to avoid making 
a surplus that would be burnt.   
Two lagged variables describe the player’s previous exposure to losses, namely the occurrence of 
a disaster in the last period and a measure of persistent bad luck in past periods.  Persistent bad 
luck is captured by the difference between the number of disasters suffered by a participant 
during the elapsed periods and the expected number of disasters given the objective probability of 
a disaster.  Since taxation guarantees the full compensation of losses and eliminates uncertainty, it 
is not surprising that the event of a disaster in the last period does not have a significant effect on 
contributions in the taxation treatments.  In sharp contrast, the occurrence of a disaster diminishes 
the probability of a positive contribution in the next period in the rationing treatments.  Since it is 
common knowledge that periods are independent, this may reveal a gambler’s fallacy, in which 
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the unlucky individual underestimates the chances that his bad luck persists in the future.13 The 
interpretation of the persistent bad luck variable’s effect is more complex.   In the treatments with 
rationing, the coefficients are positive and significant in the individualized treatment that evokes 
the “hot hand fallacy”.  Individuals seem to think that, if they have been lucky or unlucky for 
some time, they will continue to be so in the future because it reflects their nature, and so they 
must take proper risk coverage.  Such behavior runs counter the gambler’s fallacy hypothesis.  In 
the taxation treatments, however, the estimated coefficients of this variable are significantly 
negative: persistent bad luck diminishes the probability of a positive contribution.  This cannot be 
explained by any “cognitive” bias like the gambler’s fallacy or the hot hand fallacy because 
taxation policies eliminate individual risk.  Our preferred interpretation is that an “excessive” 
accumulation of bad luck triggers an emotional rejection of cooperation, just like an angry 
responder would reject a low offer in the ultimatum game.  
Overall, individual behavior tends to gradually diverge from the optimum and converge toward 
the Nash equilibrium values as players are informed of the behavior of others. In the short run, 
players move around this trend following their good or bad luck.  
4.3. Heterogeneity of Strategies 
Recent experimental literature has emphasized the heterogeneity of preferences and its 
impact on behavior in public goods games (see for example Burlando and Guala, 2005).  In our 
game, it can also be suspected that all participants do not adopt the same strategies in each 
treatment.  Thus, homogeneous groups of participants and strategies have been separated by a 
                                                 
13 An alternative explanation is that participants become more risk seeking after experiencing one loss, as they 
envision the possibility of an accumulation of losses in the future, and try to regain the experienced loss by taking 
risk and saving on contributions.  
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cluster analysis based on three discriminating variables: frequency of positive contributions, 
average and standard deviation of the contributions.  A small number of non-null contributions, a 
low average and low standard deviation of contributions should indicate a non-cooperative 
strategy, whereas a high frequency of non-null contributions suggests a cooperative strategy.  The 
standard deviation of the contributions identifies the variety of strategies. 
 Although the hierarchical Ward method identifies 8 to 10 clusters, two clusters for all treatments 
is enough to oppose very different strategies, since the other strategies are close to the second 
cluster.14  Table 4 characterizes these strategies for each treatment.   
[Table 4 about here]  
In Table 4, cluster 2 corresponds to a non-cooperative strategy: a small number of non-null 
contributions, a low average and standard deviation of contribution.  In cluster 1, the number of 
non-null contributions and the average contribution are clearly higher, while still remaining much 
smaller than the optimum.  The standard deviation of contributions is large, suggesting a hesitant 
strategy, most likely related to the reactions to the other group members' behavior.  Excluding the 
individualized taxation treatment, between 55% and 62% of the participants to the other 
treatments retain a relatively cooperative strategy compared to the other participants.  On the 
other hand, in the treatment with individualized taxation, 43% of the participants use a rather 
cooperative strategy, close to the optimum. For that treatment, the second cluster shows 
                                                 
)
14 Insofar we want to identify the most contrasting groups of behavior, we have used a difference criterion as an 
aggregation mean.  The maximum link method (the distance between two groups is given by the distances of the 
furthest object of each group) and the Ward method (minimizing the intra-group variance) are best fitting.  Since the 
Ward method tends to produce smaller groups, we have favored this method, that is, the minimization of the squared 
sum of the errors (the squared Euclidian distance ( 2
1
p
ki kj
k
x x
=
−∑ ). Regarding the choice of the number of partitions, 
insofar we want to preserve the greatest differences between groups, we examine the decreasing curve of the 
distances between the merged partitions in each stage. This curve must diminish in a monotonous fashion as the near 
partitions are merged in each stage.  If a net difference is observed in the course of iteration, it is not reasonable to 
group other partitions.  
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participants with a high number of non-null contributions, but with an average halfway to the 
optimum.   
A non-parametric analysis confirms the existence of differences between the individualized 
taxation treatment and the other treatments for the relatively cooperative cluster.  In addition, the 
null hypothesis is often rejected in comparing the treatments that do not involve individualized 
taxation.  In contrast, no difference can be found between treatments for the non cooperative 
cluster with only one exception15. 
4.4. Winning and Losing Strategies 
The participants earned 48.26 tokens on average (S.D.=15.88) in the uniform taxation 
treatment, 66.55 tokens (S.D.=39.01) in the uniform rationing treatment, 66.57 tokens 
(S.D.=32.85) in the individualized rationing treatment, and 61.69 tokens (S.D.=9.79) in the 
individualized taxation treatment.  Thus, average earnings are lowest in the uniform taxation 
treatment (see Appendix C), due to the extra cost of an ex ante deficit.  The variance of earnings 
is minimized by individualized taxation since most contributions are then concentrated around the 
optimum.  Table 5 depicts regressions by Ordinary Least Squares on the participants’ earnings.   
[Table 5 about here]  
Table 5 shows that, naturally, the number of disasters considerably affects the earnings in 
rationing treatments, since losses are not fully insured.  Frequent free-riding, as measured by the 
number of null contributions by an individual, is a winning strategy in uniform treatments, since 
it allows transferring the cost of the deficit compensation to others.  Conversely, a sustained 
                                                 
15 The exception was found in comparing average contributions and standard deviations between uniform taxation and 
individualized rationing. 
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cooperation, as measured by the number of optimal contributions by an individual, is rather self 
defeating, except for the individualized taxation treatment where the coefficient associated with 
this variable is positive, but not significant.  This effect is very pronounced in the uniform 
taxation treatment.  Repeatedly choosing to contribute the optimum in this context may seem 
strange but it might reflect leadership by example, strict adherence to the norm, or confusion.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Most developed countries are facing recurrent difficulties to finance high quality health 
insurance regimes and other collective needs.  A fraction of the taxes collected to fund these 
regimes is acceptable, therefore voluntary, but the deficit of these regimes leads to a debate on 
what the most relevant mode of financing is.  Is it more efficient from an economic point of view 
to ration the access to these services in case of a deficit, or is it better to levy additional taxes? 
Our experimental analysis participates to this discussion by analyzing under what conditions will 
economic agents cooperate to the point where the collective good can be provided efficiently to 
all of the members in need.  Four alternative institutions are compared: uniform taxation, 
individualized taxation, uniform rationing and individualized rationing.  In all cases, unlike most 
public goods games, the individual’s investment in the collective good can have a null marginal 
return if he is not the victim of a disaster.  If one keeps in mind the comparison with the health 
insurance, it means that individuals contribute even though they are in good health.  The social 
dilemma is therefore enhanced in our environment.  The theoretical modeling allows us to 
identify an interior social optimum common to all the treatments, and Nash equilibria located 
either in corner (in the case of uniform rationing and taxation), or possibly at the same level as 
the optimum (in the case of individualized taxation), or at an intermediate level (in the case of 
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individualized rationing).  This game thus allows us to test the influence of these various 
institutions on the individual decisions to contribute, and to measure the relative efficiency of 
taxation and rationing in handling the deficits.  By varying the risk associated with cooperation 
(i.e. the distance between the equilibrium and the optimum), it also permits to analyze whether 
behavior is more influenced by the optimum or by the equilibrium. 
With respect to the relative efficiency of the various institutions, the experimental results are 
compliant with the theoretical model.  Uniform rationing appears to be the worst system.  The 
service is not supplied in full since each individual is encouraged to flee cooperation.  Uniform 
taxation, while encouraging free-riding just as much, is not much more efficient since it imposes 
upon the community an excess burden and leads to the lowest average earnings.  On the contrary, 
individualization increases the contribution levels.  With individualized rationing, the collective 
good is not always supplied in full and the more unlucky an individual, the lower his earnings.  
Individualized taxation is the best institution since it increases drastically the level of 
contribution.  In other words, it gives individuals a sense of responsibility in the provision of the 
collective good.  Without always attaining the optimum, the average contribution is close to the 
optimum and stable: individuals contribute to avoid taxation.   
We complement Andreoni's (1993) conclusion that taxation (exogenous in his study) encourages 
cooperation- by ensuring that the contributors’ generosity is not exploited by others.  Indeed, we 
show that, when taxation is endogenous, his conclusion is only true for individualized taxation.  
However, it is worth noting that, even when taxation is individualized, the optimum is reached 
hardly more than 10% of the time and voluntary contributions remain slightly inferior to the 
optimum on average.  This could be the consequence of our assumption that budget surpluses are 
not credited to the next period.  It could also denote a very slight crowding-out effect of the 
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taxation on the voluntary contribution, or some confusion about the consequences of taxation in 
terms of tax overload from some subjects.   
Our policy conclusions should be taken with caution, as they might be sensitive to factors that 
were kept constant in our experiment like size and probability of loss, use of budget surplus and 
loading factor.  It is however likely that our main qualitative conclusions regarding the 
superiority of individualized over uniform treatments and of taxation over rationing remain valid 
for plausible values of the parameters.  The results regarding how an institution can improve the 
sense of individual responsibility suggest the instigation of user fees or deductibles: individuals 
participate to the funding of the program according to their needs.  Although all have the same 
probability to benefit from the program, the tax funding ensures its existence, while the user fees 
mark out those who effectively use and abuse the collective good. 
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Table 1. Theoretical solutions 
 
ig  Social Optimum Nash Equilibrium 
Uniform Taxation 
L
N
 0  (if 1−≤ NLα ) 
Individualized Taxation 
L
N
 
Almost optimal contribution and 
moderate budget deficit with 
mixture of over and under 
contributions  
Uniform Rationing 
L
N
 0 
Individualized Rationing 
L
N
 Interior: 
N
Lgi <<0  
 
 
Table 2. Average contributions by period by treatment 
 
  Uniform Taxation Uniform Rationing Individualized Taxation Individualized Rationing
  coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat 
Period -0.276 -20.45 -0.207 -12.94 -0.014 -0.70 -0.100 -5.92 
Constant 17.543 44.37 14.055 29.96 27.520 47.40 18.282 36.93 
2R  0.895 0.773 -0.010 0.410 
 
Note: In the OLS estimations, we have 50 observations per treatment 
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Table 3. Probability and determinants of the positive contributions by treatment (periods 2 to 50) 
 
Treatment Uniform Taxation Uniform Rationing Individualized Taxation  Individualized Rationing 
 Random effects probit model FGLS panel 
Random effects 
probit model FGLS panel 
Random effects 
probit model FGLS panel 
Random effects 
probit model FGLS panel 
Variable             
                     
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Period -0.015 -6.948 -0.415 -7.579 -0.022 -10.806 -0.095 -0.767 -0.007 -5.078 0.012 0.372 0.0017 1.389 -0.134 -6.646
Others’ contribution in t-1 0.151 4.572 0.588 1.058 0.026 0.556 -0.827 -1.572 -0.046 -0.835 -0.896 -1.566 0.011  0.318  -0.108    
             
                     
                     
                   
                    
             
                    
                    
                     
                  
              
              
          
                  
          
              
          
-0.328
Others’ contribution in t-1* 
ex ante deficit in t-1 0.065 0.748 -1.379 -1.828
Disaster in  t-1 -0.016 -0.265 0.155 0.255 -0.348 -7.248 4.191 2.027 -0.110 -1.335 0.407 0.537 -0.5099  -10.336  -3.243  -3.235  
Disasters minus anticipated 
disasters -0.032 -1.805 -0.395 -1.970 0.030 1.499 0.288 0.920 -0.030 -2.757 0.073 0.316 0.018  2.001  0.600  3.211  
Age 0.004 0.303 0.338 1.492 -0.042 -3.240 0.879 2.157 0.023 1.620 -0.174 -0.603 -0.029 -2.771 -0.021 -0.066
Gender (Males=1) 0.393 4.164 0.650 0.249 -0.414 -3.481 7.344 1.890 -0.818 -4.873 3.667 0.928 -1.640  -13.049  -1.025  -0.294  
Experience 0.964 6.075 7.956 1.631 -0.357 -1.577 -11.516 -2.514 0.098 0.493 3.154 1.035 0.305 3.487 -0.595 -0.197
Lottery 0.076 0.841 1.592 0.697 0.314 2.968 -6.952 -1.983 0.170 1.088 4.816 1.624 -0.186  -2.151 0.514 0.189
Student (Reference : 
worker and unemployed) -0.802 -2.674 -5.088 -1.208 0.129 0.602 -8.111 -1.485 0.672 2.011 6.935 1.159 -0.926 -1.418 -4.141 -0.846
Graduate -0.885 -5.171 -6.058 -1.504 0.750 6.218 -7.001 -1.198 0.569 2.745 -5.574 -1.266 0.622  3.178  -9.078  -2.444  
Mathematical training 0.109 1.011 2.206 0.779 -0.185 -1.510 2.645 0.659 0.085 0.318 -0.694 -0.191 -0.460 -2.808 2.515 0.702  
Montreal (Reference : 
Lyon) 0.266 2.505 3.285 1.377 0.525 4.076 -8.416 -1.560 0.273 1.411 3.631 1.142 0.916 7.464 9.314 2.783
Constant 0.393 0.857 4.840 0.524 1.418 3.564 32.027 3.158 1.198 1.954 21.679 1.775 3.692 4.856 25.123 2.342
ρ 0.575 19.180 0.625 26.639 0.580 10.416 0.621 22.280
IMR 12.297 1.976 -14.441 -1.673 -30.104 -0.980 3.186  0.730
R2 0.093 0.178 0.080 0.078
Observations 3528 2187 3528 1655 3528 3030 3528 2537
Value of the likelihood :
V : constrained -2342.99   -2438.68 -1436.10 -2094.92
V : probit -2211.88 -2244.30 -1337.29 -1949.83
V : probit panel -1599.59   -1493.57 -989.03 -1411.18
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Table 4. Cluster analysis of strategies  
 
Treatment Uniform Taxation Uniform Rationing Individualized Taxation  Individualized Rationing 
Clusters Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
Frequency of non-null contributions         
Average  % 42.333 15.667 37.051 7.939 48.742 38.537 44.622  21.815  
Standard Deviation 6.566 8.049 10.252 6.364 1.999 11.809 6.847  11.139  
Average of the contributions         
Average number of tokens 14.517 4.889         
        
        
    
14.177 2.379 40.163 17.335 20.828 7.235
Standard Deviation 9.289 3.403 11.504 2.475 10.304 8.396 10.046 4.954
Average of the standard deviations 
of the contributions 
Average 12.196 8.564 13.843 5.558 17.559 14.246 13.609  9.769  
Standard Deviation 7.241 5.600 8.637 5.377 8.015 7.148 8.735  4.686   
Number of observations 42 30 39 33 31  41 45  27  
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 Table 5. Participants’ earnings 
Treatment Uniform Taxation Uniform Rationing Individualized Taxation 
Individualized 
Rationing  
Variable         
     
coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat
Number of disasters -3.152 -0.22 -71.834 -4.54 6.287 1.48 -59.900 -6.46 
Contribution in the first period -4.593 -1.23     
      
      
       
  
       
    
       
    
  
-10.111 -3.00 -1.972 -2.37 -6.281 -3.25 
Number of choices of a null 
contribution 10.904 2.79 10.989 3.27 3.026 2.04 -1.173 -0.42 
Number of choices of an optimum 
contribution  -15.148 -2.05 -23.300 -1.43 1.594 0.81 -8.190 -2.02 
Age 6.011 0.53 -6.409 -0.58 -0.472 -0.17 -6.567 -0.81 
Gender 72.459 0.65 -151.729 -1.52 -1.684  -0.06  26.273 0.33 
Experience 155.834 0.97 579.577 4.15 30.688 1.05 -2.013 -0.03 
Lottery -23.861 -0.22 -50.835 -0.54 -62.013  -2.21 -10.086 -0.14 
Student (Reference : worker and 
unemployed) -103.33 -0.53 -116.153 -0.60 -70.056 -1.19 137.124 1.05 
Graduated student -40.267 -0.25 104.788 0.74 35.020  0.87  129.958 1.34 
Mathematical Training 
3.679 0.03 -44.640 -0.37 0.592  0.02  -9.160 -0.10 
Montreal (Ref. : Lyon) 83.820 0.75 277.587 2.17
30.309 
 1.02  -21.596 -0.28 
Constant 2338.854 5.00 4400.394 9.35 3276.084  21.57  4723.608 15.84 
2R  0.167   0.516 0.254 0.453 
 
OLS: 72 observations. 
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 Fig.1. Evolution of the average contributions over time per treatment 
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APPENDIX A – Technical Appendix 
 
1) Social optimum under uniform and individualized rationing 
Let us assume: Ld
S
= ,
N
Sp = , 0 i Lg N≤ ≤ , and calculate the derivative of (8): 
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⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+′−−−−+′−=∂
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Hence, 
i
i
g
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∂
∂ 0≥ for all 
N
Lgi ≤ (and for 0= N
Lgi = ).  
Since is continuous in)( ii gEU i
Lg
N
= and has a maximum at this point, whether 
N
Lgi ≤≤0 or 
N
Lgi ≥ , the social optimum corresponds to N
Lgi = .  
 
2) Nash equilibrium under individualized rationing 
Proposal 1:  The Nash equilibrium necessarily comprises rationing if NLg i ≤− . 
Proof. We show that a no-rationing equilibrium is impossible if NLg i ≤− . The best response of 
player i consistent with full insurance would be DgNLg ii ≡−−= −)1( and his utility of wealth 
would then be . The expected utility of i under rationing if his contribution is D 
is given by (13):  
)100( DwU ii −+
)
)(
1
1
100()100()1()( D
DL
N
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L
S
LDwpUDwUpDEU iiiii
−−
−+
+−−++−+−=  
≥)(DEU i )100( DwU ii −+  
implies: 
)(
1
1 DL
N
SD
L
S
L
−−
−+
+− 0≥ , which boils down to NLg i ≤− .  
Assuming that NLg i ≤− , we now demonstrate that the best response under rationing is a 
contribution strictly lower than D so that the Nash equilibrium implies rationing under such 
condition. To show this, we establish that the partial derivative of is negative wheniEU Dgi = . 
From (13), we derive: 
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if NLg i ≤− and . For showing that0<′′iU 0)( <=∂
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i , it is sufficient to prove that  
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or, after some rearrangement of terms 
[ ] 2222 )(2)1( DSNSDNLDLS −<+−−  
Since the term between brackets is negative if [ ]1,1 NLD ∈ , the above inequality holds for all 
admissible values of LD conditional on NLg i ≤− , q.e.d.   
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium must comprise rationing. 
 
Proposal 2: The Nash equilibrium with individualized rationing corresponds to a positive 
contribution. 
 
Proof. Return to expression (A.2.1) and take: 0=ig : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 100 100
1
−∂ ⎛ ⎞′ ′= − − + + + −⎜ ⎟∂ −⎝ ⎠
i
i i i i
i
N SEU Lp U w pU w
g S S
  
This derivative is positive when:
N
Sp = , if 0≤′′iU  for all values of ig− . Thus, given all the other 
contributions, the contribution of any risk averse agent that maximizes his expected utility (14) 
must be strictly positive. Since this result does not depend on the value taken on by the other 
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contributions16, the Nash equilibrium comprises rationing, but nevertheless a positive 
contribution from all the risk averse agents.  
 
                                                 
16 Under the condition that the two rationing conditions described in (13) are met.  They are always met when neighbouring 
a set of null contributions.  We are therefore certain that the set of rationing situations includes this neighbourhood and that 
the equilibrium with rationing always holds positive contributions.  
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APPENDIX B - INSTRUCTIONS 
 
TREATMENT: UNIFORM TAXATION 
 
You are participating to an experiment in which we ask you to make decisions.  Each participant makes her (his) 
decisions individually in front of her (his) computer.  
At the beginning of the experiment, you are given an initial capital of 110 tokens.  During the experiment, you can 
earn an additional amount of money.  The final amount of earnings you will get depends on your decisions and on 
the other participants’ decisions.  At the end of the experiment, your earnings in tokens will be converted into 
Canadian $ according to the following conversion rate: 300 tokens = $1.55.  You will be paid individually in a 
separate room to preserve the confidentiality of your earnings. 
Each period, you will form a group with the other 11 participants.  Communication between participants is forbidden 
and you are asked not to react loudly during the course of the experiment. 
The experiment has 50 periods.  Each period is independent of the others. 
At the beginning of each period, you will receive 100 tokens.  You can contribute to a common pool intended to 
cover the losses that will randomly strike 4 persons among the 12 group members.  Each of the 4 afflicted members 
loose their 100 tokens.  The common pool is equal to the sum of the contributions by each group member.  Three 
situations can occur:   
 The common pool is of 400 tokens.  This allows all 4 afflicted members to regain their 100 lost tokens each. 
 The common pool is greater than the sum of the lost tokens.  In this case, the 4 afflicted members regain their 
100 lost tokens and the surplus is not reported to the next period.  
 The common pool is insufficient to allow the 4 afflicted members to regain their 100 lost tokens.  In this case, 
a deduction is carried out.  The amount of this deduction is equal to the difference between the common pool 
and the total of 400 lost tokens by the 4 afflicted members.  This deduction added to the common pool allows 
the 4 afflicted members to regain their lost tokens.  Each of the 12 group members pays 1/12 of this deduction.  
Furthermore, this deduction leads to an additional cost for each group member, increasing with the importance 
of the deficit, as described in the table below.   
Table of your additional deduction cost 
 
Class of deficit in tokens Individual additional deduction cost  in 
tokens 
  
1 to 130 5 
131 to 202 8 
203 to 255 13 
256 to 298 18 
299 to 336 23 
337 to 370 28 
371 to 400 33 
 
Rules for each period 
You will be given 100 tokens. 
You choose, with the help of a cursor, the number of these tokens between 0 and 100 that you allocate to the 
common pool.  This choice is validated as soon as you click on the OK button.  
The computer then gives you 5 pieces of information: 
 
- You are or not one of the 4 persons who each loose their 100 tokens 
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- The total amount of the common pool  
- If applicable, the total amount of the deficit 
- In case of a deficit, the amount of your total deduction 
- Your earnings in tokens for this period. 
 
A new period, independent of the previous ones, is automatically shown.  Each period, you receive a new allocation 
of 100 tokens.  A new random draw determines the afflicted members.  The conditions described above continue to 
apply. 
 How we determine your earnings 
During a period, your earnings are calculated by the computer the following way: 
Your 100 tokens  
- the tokens that you allocate to the common pool 
- the tokens that you lost if you were afflicted 
+ the reimbursement of your lost tokens if you are afflicted, 
and, if required, 
- your individual deduction 
- your additional deduction cost  
 
At the end of the experimental session, your total earnings are calculated by the sum of your earnings for each of the 
50 periods, plus the initial capital.  It is this amount that will be converted in Canadian $.  
Additional information 
Before we begin the experimental session, we will ask you to answer a few comprehension questions on these 
instructions.  As soon as you have all answered correctly all the questions, you will be asked to provide us some 
details on your age, gender, level and field of education, university or school currently frequented or your current 
work situation, and if you have participated to an experiment before.  This information will remain anonymous.  The 
experiment will then begin.    
After taking place in front of your computer, please raise your hand if you have questions on these instructions.  We 
will come and answer your questions privately.  
 
TREATMENT: INDIVIDUALIZED RATIONING 
You are participating to an experiment in which we ask you to make decisions.  Each participant makes her (his) 
decisions individually in front of her (his) computer.  
At the beginning of the experiment, you are given an initial capital of 110 tokens.  During the experiment, you can 
earn an additional amount of money.  The final amount of earnings you will get depends on your decisions and on 
the other participants’ decisions.  At the end of the experiment, your earnings in tokens will be converted into 
Canadian $ according to the following conversion rate: 300 tokens = $1.55.  You will be paid individually in a 
separate room to preserve the confidentiality of your earnings. 
Each period, you will form a group with the other 11 participants.  Communication between participants is forbidden 
and you are asked not to react loudly during the course of the experiment. 
The experiment has 50 periods.  Each period is independent of the others. 
At the beginning of each period, you will receive 100 tokens.  You can contribute to a common pool intended to 
cover the losses that will randomly strike 4 persons among the 12 group members.  Each of the 4 afflicted members 
loose their 100 tokens.  The common pool is equal to the sum of the contributions by each group member.  Three 
situations can occur: 
 The common pool is of 400 tokens.  This allows all 4 afflicted members to regain their 100 lost tokens each. 
 44
 The common pool is greater than the sum of the lost tokens.  In this case, the 4 afflicted members regain their 
100 lost tokens and the surplus is not reported to the next period. 
 The common pool is insufficient to allow the 4 afflicted members to regain their 100 lost tokens.  In this case, 
each one of the 4 afflicted members receives a reimbursement that depends on two elements: his contribution to 
the common pool with respect to the other afflicted members in the group and the total amount of the common 
pool.  The common pool is thus redistributed to the 4 afflicted members proportionally to how much each has 
contributed with respect to the other afflicted members and within the limit of their initial loss.  
Rules for each period 
You will be given 100 tokens. 
You choose, with the help of a cursor, the number of these tokens between 0 and 100 that you allocate to the 
common pool.  This choice is validated as soon as you click on the OK button.  
The computer then gives you 5 pieces of information: 
- You are or not one of the 4 persons who each loose their 100 tokens 
- The total amount of the common pool  
- If applicable, the total amount of the deficit 
- The number of tokens that are allocated to you if you are afflicted 
- Your earnings in tokens for this period. 
A new period, independent of the previous ones, is automatically shown.  Each period, you receive a new allocation 
of 100 tokens.  A new random draw determines the afflicted members.  The conditions described above continue to 
apply. 
 How we determine your earnings 
During a period, your earnings are calculated by the computer the following way: 
Your 100 tokens 
- the tokens that you allocate to the common pool 
- the tokens that you have lost if you are afflicted 
 
and, if the common pool is sufficient
+ the reimbursement of your lost tokens if you are afflicted 
or, if the common pool is insufficient
+ the reimbursement proportionally to how much each has contributed with respect to the other afflicted members 
and within the limit of your initial loss. 
At the end of the experimental session, your total earnings are calculated by the sum of your earnings for each of the 
50 periods, plus the initial capital.  It is this amount that will be converted in Canadian $. 
Additional information 
Before we begin the experimental session, we will ask you to answer a few comprehension questions on these 
instructions.  As soon as you have all answered correctly all the questions, you will be asked to provide us some 
details on your age, gender, level and field of education, university or school currently frequented or your current 
work situation, and if you have participated to an experiment before.  This information will remain anonymous.  The 
experiment will then begin.    
After taking place in front of your computer, please raise your hand if you have questions on these instructions.  We 
will come and answer your questions privately. 
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APPENDIX C - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Definition All treatments Uniform Taxation Uniform Rationing Individualized Rationing Individualized Taxation
  Average 
Std 
deviation Average 
Std 
deviation Average
Std 
deviation Average 
Std  
deviation Average Std deviation
Individual contribution to the common pool 15.54 19.61 10.50 15.26 8.77 16.55 15.74 17.77 27.16 22.55 
%  null contributions 33.0  38.0  53.0  28.0  14.0  
% optimal contributions   5.0  4.0  1.0  4.0  10.0  
Contribution to the common pool 186.52 109.62 126.06 73.78 105.24 70.62 188.77 63.96 326.01 61.79 
Value of the pool - 400 to compensate victims -213.48 109.61 -273.94 73.78 -294.76 70.62 -211.23 63.96 -73.99 61.79 
Rate of periods with a deficit  0.97 0.18 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.08 0.87 0.33 
Sum of the others’ contributions in the 
previous period 171.89 101.65 116.84 69.04 97.64 66.63 173.76 61.00 299.33 60.16 
Number of disasters achieved in t minus the 
anticipated number  0.98 2.40 0.98 2.42 0.98 2.18 0.98 2.40 0.98 2.58 
Participants earnings in tokens 60.76 28.16 48.26 15.88 66.55 39.01 66.57 32.85 61.69 9.79 
        4.78   
Participants’ age 24.12 5.25 23.99 5.67 23.54 4.57 24.87  24.07 5.77 
%  male participants  67.0  65.0  67.0  76.0  58.0  
% participants who have already participated 
to an experiment 79.0  87.0  85.0  75.0  69.0  
% participants who chose the lottery 62.0  64.0  64.0  60.0  60.0  
% Workers 5.0  5.0  4.0  6.0  6.0  
% Unemployed 
4.0  7.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  
% Students 91.0  87.0  94.0  92.0  92.0  
% Graduated 19.0  18.0  21.0  21.0  15.0  
% Students with a mathematical background 80.0  81.0  79.0  83.0  78.0  
 
Note: Statistics based on 3800 observations per treatment. 
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